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LITIGATION FOLLOWING A CYBER ATTACK: 
POSSIBLE OUTCOMES AND MITIGATION 
STRATEGIES UTILIZING THE SAFETY ACT 
Brian E. Finch† and Leslie H. Spiegel†† 
Abstract 
Liability for a cyber attack is not limited to the attackers.  An 
attack may be foreseeable in some circumstances, and the failure of 
the target or the other entities to take steps to prevent the attack can 
constitute a breach of duty to injured victims.  In the absence of the 
protections provided by the Support Anti-Terrorism By Fostering 
Effective Technologies (SAFETY) Act, a cyber attack on a chemical 
facility could give rise to a number of common-law tort and contract 
claims against the target of the attack and other entities, potentially 
including the target’s cyber security vendors. This article discusses 
claims that might arise in various cyber attack scenarios and the 
effect of the SAFETY Act on these potential claims. 
The SAFETY Act is a tort liability management statute that was 
passed as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.  Under the 
SAFETY Act, entities that sell or otherwise deploy products that can 
be used to deter, defend against, respond to, mitigate, or otherwise 
combat “acts of terrorism” are eligible to receive liability 
protections.  These liability protections can take the form of 
jurisdictional defenses, a cap on liability, or a presumption of 
immediate dismissal of third-party liability claims. 
 This article reviews several scenarios to examine whether 
liability could be found against companies that make cyber security 
tools or against entities that purchase such tools.  The article then 
examines how the SAFETY Act could be utilized to mitigate or 
eliminate such liability. 
 
 
 
 †  Brian E. Finch is a partner at Dickstein Shapiro LLP and a Professorial Lecturer of 
Law at The George Washington University Law School.  He blogs for the Huffington Post on 
cyber security and has a weekly cyber security column on the Fox business network website.  
 †† Leslie H. Spiegel is a Senior Risk and Compliance Attorney at Dickstein Shapiro. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Liability for a cyber attack is not limited to the attackers.  An 
attack may be foreseeable in some circumstances, and the failure of 
the target or the other entities to take steps to prevent the attack can 
constitute a breach of duty to injured victims.  In the absence of the 
protections provided by the Support Anti-Terrorism By Fostering 
Effective Technologies (SAFETY) Act, a cyber attack on a chemical 
facility could give rise to a number of common-law tort and contract 
claims
1
 against the target of the attack and other entities, potentially 
including the target’s cyber security vendors. This article discusses 
claims that might arise in various cyber attack scenarios and the effect 
of the SAFETY Act on these potential claims.
2
 
The SAFETY Act is a tort liability management statute that was 
passed as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
3
 Under the 
SAFETY Act, entities that sell or otherwise deploy products that can 
be used to deter, defend against, respond to, mitigate, or otherwise 
combat “acts of terrorism” are eligible to receive liability protections.  
These liability protections can take the form of jurisdictional 
defenses, a cap on liability, or a presumption of immediate dismissal 
of third-party liability claims. 
As discussed above, this article will review several scenarios to 
examine whether liability could be found against companies that 
make cyber security tools or against entities that purchase such tools.  
The article will then examine how the SAFETY Act could be utilized 
to mitigate or eliminate such liability. 
I. LIABILITY SCENARIOS FOLLOWING A CYBER ATTACK 
Cyber attacks are a well-recognized threat in today’s world.4  
 
 1. Other civil claims may also arise from a cyber attack.  This article does not discuss 
potential claims based on the theft of personal information, claims based on state or federal 
environmental regulations, claims based on other statutory law, potential liability for criminal 
negligence, or other criminal claims including claims against the attackers themselves.  See, e.g., 
JENNIFER L. MACHLIN & TOMME R. YOUNG, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK - REAL 
ESTATE AND BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS LAW § 8:21 (West ed., 2012) (discussing landowners’ 
potential environmental liability for contamination caused by third parties’ acts). 
 2. Of course, various common law or other defenses also may be available to these 
claims, and these claims might be more or less viable depending on the circumstances. 
 3. See 6 U.S.C. § 441-44 (2002). 
 4. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT 
OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (Jan. 29, 2014), available 
at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/2014%20WWTA%20%20SFR_
SSCI_29_Jan.pdf (statement for the record of James R. Clapper, Director of National 
Intelligence). 
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Companies are regularly subjected to breach attempts by individuals, 
organized crime, and even nation-states.  These attacks have various 
motives, ranging from the theft of financial information or intellectual 
property to the disruption or destruction of operations, data, or 
physical facilities.
5
  Below are several scenarios describing potential 
cyber attacks and an examination about the potential liability resulting 
from each. 
A. Scenario One 
A company that stores dangerous chemicals in large multi-
thousand gallon tanks purchases cyber security software and hardware 
(physical devices attached to IT systems as a cyber security measure) 
to prevent outsiders from breaking into their industrial control 
systems.  Through news reports and government-furnished 
intelligence, the company is well aware that, while it is not being 
specifically targeted by cyber-attackers, hackers have been breaking 
into chemical companies and seeking to take control of industrial 
control systems.  The company has purchased “firewall” and “anti-
virus” systems to protect its facilities, including the systems that 
control the storage tanks.  Alternative cyber security systems could 
have been purchased that would have protected against additional 
types of threats.  However, the company elected not to purchase such 
cyber security technologies.  A sophisticated cyber attack then occurs.  
The attack was specifically designed to avoid the cyber defenses the 
company purchased.  As a result of the attack, dangerous chemicals 
were released into the atmosphere, seriously injuring a number of 
people in a two-mile radius and even killing several people.  In 
addition, because of the release of the chemicals, deliveries to the 
company’s customers are delayed or cancelled, causing those 
customers to slow or even halt production of their products. 
1. Claims Against the Chemical Company 
Under the laws of various jurisdictions, the company might be 
liable for a variety of common law claims including negligence, strict 
 
 5. See, e.g., U.S. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., AND TRANSP., A “KILL CHAIN” 
ANALYSIS OF THE 2013 TARGET DATA BREACH (Mar. 26, 2014), available at 
http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=24d3c229-4f2f-405d-b8db-
a3a67f183883; FireEye Advanced Threat Report – 2H 2012, FIREEYE 14-17, 
http://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/fireeye-advanced-threat-report-2h2012.pdf (last 
accessed Mar. 30, 2014); Ellen Knickmeyer, After Cyberattacks, Saudi Steps Up Online 
Security, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Aug. 26, 2014, 10:22 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/middleeast/2013/08/26/after-cyberattacks-saudi-steps-up-online-security/. 
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liability for abnormally dangerous activities, and contract claims.   
a. Negligence Claims 
A plaintiff injured by the release of chemicals may allege that 
the storage company had an obligation to take further steps to prevent 
the cyber attack.  The success of this claim will depend on: the 
foreseeability of the harm, the extent of the company’s duty to the 
plaintiff, and the causal connection between the company’s failure to 
act and the harm.  A defendant’s negligence may give rise to liability, 
even if a third party’s criminal activity also contributed to the 
plaintiff’s harm, if the criminal activity was foreseeable.6 
Several cases suggest that large-scale terrorist attacks may be 
foreseeable in some circumstances.  For example, in a 2004 decision, 
a New York state court rejected an argument that the 1993 bombing 
of the World Trade Center was unforeseeable as a matter of law.
7
  
The court noted that the duty of property owners and landlords who 
hold their land “open to the public” includes an obligation to “tak[e] 
minimal security precautions against reasonably foreseeable criminal 
acts by third parties.”8  A particular harm may be foreseeable if the 
landlord knew or should have known of the risk of that harm.
9
 
[A] landlord does not need to have had a past experience with the 
exact criminal activity, in the same place, and of the same type, 
before liability can be imposed for failing to take reasonable 
precautions to discover, warn, or protect.  The inquiry focuses on 
what risks were reasonably to be perceived.
10
 
 
 6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 448, 449 (1965); Ellen M. Bublick, 
Upside Down? Terrorists, Proprietors, and Civil Responsibility for Crime Prevention in the 
Post-9/11 Tort-Reform World, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1483, 1511 (2008) (“[P]roperty owners are 
ordinarily expected to take reasonable care to protect against foreseeable crime.”); Vincent R. 
Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 273 
(2005) (suggesting that database administrators may be liable for injury from cyber attacks, 
particularly when the administrators have a business relationship with the victims, because 
identity theft is a foreseeable result of inadequately securing data); but cf. Port Authority of New 
York and New Jersey v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305, 318-19 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that “the 
[1993] World Trade Center bombing was not a natural or probable consequence of any design 
defect in defendants’ products”). 
 7. See generally In re World Trade Center Bombing Litig., 776 N.Y.S.2d 713 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2004) (denying summary judgment for the Port Authority of New York and New 
Jersey). 
 8. Id.  at 734. 
 9. Id. at 734-36 (holding that a terrorist attack was not unforeseeable as a matter of law 
when there was “evidence of the [building operator’s] actual notice of the risk of infiltration of 
this kind of terrorist activity”). 
 10. Id. at 735, 739 (finding that the property owner’s own security analysis and other 
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Similarly, a federal court declined to dismiss claims against 
airlines and airplane manufacturers by plaintiffs injured in the 
September 11 attacks.
11
  “In order to be considered foreseeable, the 
precise manner in which the harm was inflicted need not be perfectly 
predicted.”12  The airlines “reasonably could foresee that crashes 
causing death and destruction on the grounds was a hazard that would 
arise should hijackers take control of a plane” through inadequate 
security screening, even if they could not foresee the specific 
attacks.
13
  Likewise, an airplane manufacturer might have foreseen 
“that a failure to design a secure cockpit could contribute to a 
breaking and entering into, and a take-over of, a cockpit by hijackers 
or other unauthorized individuals.”14 
A similar standard of care may apply to cyber attacks that result 
in personal injury or property damage.
15
  An injured claimant would 
need to show that the chemical company violated its duty of 
reasonable care by failing to protect against a foreseeable danger.
16
 
The backside of the general rule that insulates the defendant from 
liability in cases of unforeseeable intervening criminal acts is that 
if a criminal or intentional intervening act is foreseeable, or is part 
of the original risk negligently created by the defendant in the first 
place, then the harm is not outside the scope of the defendant’s 
liability—or as most courts still put it, the criminal or intentional 
act is not a superseding cause.
17
 
Whether an attack was foreseeable will involve factual questions 
 
information put it “on notice of a serious risk of infiltration of terrorist activity in the parking 
garage” where the attack took place). 
 11. See generally In re September 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 12. Id. at 295. 
 13. Id. at 296. 
 14. Id. at 307, 312-13. 
 15. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of 
Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1585 (2005) (“The owner of a website, like any 
other retail establishment, could theoretically be liable for the reasonably foreseeable harm 
caused by third parties that injure customers.”). 
 16. Cf. Levy-Zentner Co. v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d 762, 781 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (reasoning that a landowner could be liable for injuries from a fire possibly 
caused by third parties when “the [plaintiff] tenants and owners presented evidence strongly 
indicating that the fire danger presented by itinerants was reasonably foreseeable”); cf. Tyson v. 
Danbury Mall Ltd. P’ship., 811 N.Y.S.2d 105, 105-06 (N.Y. App. 2d 2006) (holding that a 
property owner and manager were not liable for injuries to a plaintiff that occurred when the 
plaintiff chased a suspected thief because the defendants “provided sufficient security and [] the 
conduct of the individual who stole the plaintiff’s wallet, which gave rise to the plaintiff’s 
injuries, was not foreseeable”). 
 17. DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 209 
(2d ed. 2013). 
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related to, inter alia, the risk of the particular attack that occurred, the 
company’s awareness of the risk, and the standard of care generally 
applied to companies storing dangerous chemicals.
18
 
The nature of the company’s duty to an injured plaintiff may also 
be relevant.  An entity that stores or handles dangerous chemicals 
may have a heightened duty of care.
19
  Whether the nature of the 
company’s work gives rise to that heightened duty of care and 
whether or not it met that duty will depend on the circumstances.  The 
company could be liable for negligent storage or other negligence if 
reasonable additional security protections would have prevented the 
attack.
20
  Although in some circumstances the criminal act of a third 
party acts as a superseding cause of harm, that rule may not apply 
when “the [defendant] at the time of his negligent conduct realized or 
should have realized the likelihood that such a situation might be 
created, and that a third person might avail himself of the opportunity 
to commit such a tort of crime.”21  In that case, site operators may be 
held liable for harm caused to third parties by criminal intrusion on 
 
 18. See In re September 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d at 301 (“A finding of duty does not 
require a defendant to have been aware of a specific hazard.  It is enough to have foreseen the 
risk of serious fires within the buildings and the goal of terrorists to attack the buildings.”); 
James v. Jamie Towers Housing Co., Inc., 790 N.E.2d 1147, 1148-49 (2003) (“[B]y providing 
locking doors, an intercom service and 24–hour security, [a property owner] discharged its 
common-law duty to take minimal security precautions against reasonably foreseeable criminal 
acts by third parties . . . .”); In re World Trade Center Bombing Litig., 776 N.Y.S.2d 713 (2004) 
(discussing foreseeability of particular terrorist attack); cf. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 
Standards, 6 C.F.R. § 27.410 (2012) (“Nothing in this part shall confer upon any person except 
the Secretary a right of action, in law or equity, for any remedy including, but not limited to, 
injunctions or damages to enforce any provision of this Part.”); AMERICAN CHEMISTRY 
COUNSEL ET AL., SITE SECURITY GUIDELINES FOR THE U.S. CHEMICAL INDUSTRY (2001), 
available at http://www.socma.com/assets/File/socma1/PDFfiles/securityworkshop/SecurityGui
deFinal10-22.pdf. 
 19. 59 N.Y. JUR. 2D Explosives and Fires § 37 (“Since the measure of care required is that 
which is proportionate to the danger, a person who has in his or her possession an explosive 
substance of a dangerous character is bound to the exercise of a high degree of care to keep and 
guard it so as to prevent injury to others, and such duty cannot be delegated to an independent 
contractor.”); see Garza v. United States 809 F.2d 1170, 1172 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting “the 
elevated duty of care imposed by Texas law on those who use and handle explosives”); see also 
Mayor and Council of City of Morgan City v. Jesse J. Fontenot, Inc., 460 So. 2d 685, 687 (La. 
Ct. App. 1984) (noting that companies that stored and transported dangerous chemicals “were 
under a duty to carefully handle the combustible and/or flammable liquids in their control or 
possession so that an unreasonable risk of harm would not be created for others”); see generally 
Pond v. Regis, 270 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966) (noting that landowners may have a 
duty to a child trespasser to maintain explosives safely). 
 20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965). 
 21. See id.; see also 14 N.Y. PRAC., NEW YORK LAW OF TORTS § 6:22 (“The chief factor 
in determining whether the defendant [landowner] owes a duty to a plaintiff to prevent harm 
from a third person is foreseeability of the risk of harm.”). 
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their site.
22
 
In this scenario, the company was “well aware of the 
cyberthreat,” and depending on the circumstances, a finder of fact 
might conclude that the cyber attack and the resulting chemical 
release and injuries were foreseeable.
23
  The company’s failure to 
procure effective cyber security systems might then be considered a 
proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries.24 
However, the mere fact that the company was aware of the risk 
of a cyber attack may not be enough to render the cyber attack 
foreseeable and the company liable.
25
  The failure to secure the site 
 
 22. See Yukon Equipment, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Alaska 
1978) (finding that “[t]he incendiary destruction of premises by thieves to cover evidence of 
theft is not so uncommon an occurrence that it can be regarded as highly extraordinary [and] the 
particular kind of result threatened by the defendant’s conduct, the storage of explosives, was an 
explosion at the storage site,” and so the criminal activity was not a superseding cause of 
injury); Randolph C. Visser et al., Volatile Combinations, LOS ANGELES LAWYER, Nov. 2002, at 
39 (“[C]hemical companies may also have a duty to protect their sites.”). 
 23. See In re September 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (1965) (“If the likelihood that a third person may act 
in a particular manner is the hazard . . . which makes the actor negligent, such an act, whether 
innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being 
liable for harm caused thereby.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 
19 cmt. c (2013) (“If the third party’s misconduct is among the risks making the defendant’s 
conduct negligent, then ordinarily plaintiff’s harm will be within the defendant’s scope of 
liability.”); Visser, supra note 22, at 42 (“[C]ourts must now determine whether the events of 
September 11, 2001, when combined with the 1995 Oklahoma City and 1993 World Trade 
Center bombings and the political trend to protect the public from potential chemical terrorism, 
have served to put all industries that deal in hazardous substances on notice to consider the 
foreseeability of their products being used in a terrorist attack.”); cf. Levy-Zentner Co. v. 
Southern Pac. Transportation Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d 762, 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (noting that a 
fire caused by trespassers on a landowner’s property may have been foreseeable). 
 24. See Doyle v. Exxon Corp., 592 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1979) (reasoning that, under 
Vermont law, when a gas station owner was aware of a particular gas station’s vulnerability to 
robbery and also of additional protections that could be put into place, “a jury could logically 
conclude that the criminal events at [a gas] station on the night in question resulted, at least in 
part, from [an owner’s] failure to install in a timely fashion a system designed to prevent the 
very wrong that occurred, even though a contrary conclusion could rationally be based on the 
same evidence”); see also Levy-Zentner Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d at 776 (stating that a landowner 
could be held negligent for losses from a fire that began in its property when among other 
factors it “neglected the rudiments of basic fire protection and inspection . . . and in violation of 
its own regulations failed to take precautions against continuing itinerant activity that had also 
caused [an earlier] fire”). 
 25. See Order and Opinion Granting United’s Motion for Summary Judgment That It Had 
No Duty for Flight 11, In re September 11 Litig., No. 21 MC 101 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 
2012) (finding that harm from terrorist attack was not reasonably foreseeable to an airline that 
assisted in security screening when the terrorists used another airline’s planes in the attack and 
noting New York courts’ “caution regarding the extension of liability to defendants for their 
failure to control the conduct of others in light of the potential for unfairness and potentially 
limitless liability”); District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d 30, 33 (D.C. 1987) (“[B]ecause of 
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properly must have negligently “created or increased the risk of 
harm,” or the company must have had another specific duty to the 
injured parties.
26
 
A claimant might argue that the company’s failure to procure 
appropriate security systems “increased the risk of harm” in light of 
the company’s knowledge that its site would be an attractive target for 
terrorists and that it was vulnerable to a particular type of attack.
27
  
Whether that argument would succeed would depend on the 
circumstances, including the foreseeability of the particular attack that 
occurred and the adequacy of the company’s protections. 
b. Strict Liability Claims 
The company could be held strictly liable if a court concludes 
that the company’s storage of the chemicals constituted an 
abnormally dangerous activity under the circumstances.
28
  Courts are 
split on when the storage of chemicals constitutes the type of 
abnormally dangerous activity that can give rise to strict liability.
29
  
Whether the company could be held strictly liable for the discharge 
 
the extraordinary nature of criminal conduct, the law requires that the foreseeability of the risk 
of such conduct must be ‘more precisely shown’ than is usually required in a typical negligence 
situation.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 cmt. a (1965); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 
17  (“once courts decide that a defendant should use reasonable care to protect the plaintiff from 
crimes, foreseeability of crime has become an issue of fact, not a rule of law. . . . [T]here is no 
blanket duty [to protect against criminal activity] any more than there is a blanket immunity”). 
 26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 cmt. a (1965); see also In re September 
11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 290-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (airlines and airport security companies 
owed a duty of care to victims of the September 11 attacks who did not travel on the planes used 
in the attack; “courts have imposed a duty when the defendant has control over the third party 
tortfeasor’s actions, or the relationship between the defendant and plaintiff requires the 
defendant to protect the plaintiff from the conduct of others”); cf. Port Authority of New York 
and New Jersey v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305, 313 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[M]anufacturers have no 
duty to prevent a criminal misuse of their products which is entirely foreign to the purpose for 
which the product was intended.”). 
 27. See District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d 30, 33 (D.C. 1987) (finding a school could 
be held liable for the rape of a student when “school officials were on notice of the danger to 
students from assaultive criminal conduct by intruders”); Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm Svcs., 412 
N.E.2d 472, 474-75 (Ill. 1980) (finding a landlord could be held liable for failing to provide 
adequate security when a tenant was injured in a crime on the premises). 
 28. See Yukon Equipment, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Alaska 
1978) (“The considerations which impel cutting off liability where there is a superseding cause 
in negligence cases also apply to cases of absolute liability”); DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, 
supra note 17 (“Courts now have generally accepted the principle that for some activities 
involving special dangers, especially those not commonly pursued, liability can be imposed 
without fault.”); Visser, supra note 22  (noting potential claims and defenses). 
 29. See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 17  (noting that courts are split on 
whether strict liability should be applied to “use or storage of explosives and similar activities”). 
FINCH & SPIEGEL  4/27/2014 7:38 PM 
358 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 30 
under a tort theory would depend on whether the applicable laws of 
the jurisdiction considered the company’s activities to be abnormally 
dangerous in light of its surroundings, the risks involved, and steps 
the company could take to mitigate those risks (if any).
30
  In addition, 
many courts are reluctant to impose strict liability on companies 
based on injury from a third party’s act.31 
c. Contract Claims 
Depending on the terms of the storage company’s agreements 
with its customers, it might also be liable for breach of contract 
claims for failing to make deliveries on time.  The viability of 
contract claims may depend in part on whether the agreements 
provide that terrorism is an excuse for non-performance or whether 
other excuses for non-performance apply.
32
 
2. Claims Against Other Entities 
Injured parties might assert products liability claims against the 
manufacturers of the chemicals or the tanks, but those claims are 
unlikely to be successful absent unusual circumstances.
33
  Courts have 
rejected similar claims arising out of terrorist attacks, finding that, in 
most circumstances, manufacturers do not have a duty to anticipate 
 
 30. DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 17 (discussing factors considered by 
courts); see also Visser, supra note 22, at 41. 
 31. Compare Bianchini v. Humble Pipe Line Co., 480 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1973) (applying 
Louisiana law and declining to hold a pipeline company strictly liable for harm caused by an oil 
leak when a ship hit the pipeline); Pecan Shoppe of Springfield, Missouri, Inc. v. Tri-State 
Motor Transit Co., 573 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (finding a motor carrier transporting 
dynamite not strictly liable for harm caused to plaintiffs when a third party shot its truck and 
caused an explosion); with Yukon Equipment, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 
1211 (Alaska 1978).  See also Port Authority of New York and New Jersey v. Arcadian Corp., 
189 F.3d 305, 313 (3d Cir. 1999) (addressing strict liability products claims and concluding that 
manufacturers of products that were not inherently dangerous did not have an obligation to 
prevent buyers from “incorporating the [product] into another device that is or may be 
dangerous”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 34 cmt. d (2005) 
(noting a commentator’s “instinctive recoil . . . against holding the defendant strictly liable when 
a third party, seeking to cause harm, deliberately . . . ignites the defendant’s nitroglycerin 
factory”).  The Third Restatement “employs a unitary standard” but “addresses the different 
risks posed by different heads of strict liability” while “the case law in inconsistent in how much 
emphasis it places on the foreseeability of the intervening act.”   RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 34 cmt. d (2005). 
 32. See, e.g., 30 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 77:31 (4th ed., 2004) (discussing force 
majeure clauses). 
 33. See Port Authority, 189 F.3d 305; see also Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 
160 F. 3d 613 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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the criminal misuse of their products.
34
 
a. Design Defect Claims 
An injured plaintiff might assert that the manufacturer of the 
chemicals should have taken steps to decrease the risk of harm from 
the chemicals.
35
 The fact that the chemicals could be misused by 
criminals is unlikely to give rise to a successful products claim 
against the manufacturer; the plaintiff would need to establish that the 
chemicals were unsafe as used by an “ordinary consumer.”36 
The plaintiff might also allege that the tank manufacturer should 
have designed its tanks in a more secure way.
37
 Such claims could 
sound in strict liability, and their success would depend on the facts.
38
 
As a comparison, one court declined to find a builder liable for harm 
from the September 11 terrorist attacks when “‘[t]he risk reasonably 
to be perceived’ by [defendants], and their ‘duty to be obeyed,’ [in 
designing the building] did not encompass the strange, improbable, 
and attenuated chain of events that led to 7 World Trade Center’s 
collapse” and other losses.39 
b. Failure-to-Warn Claims 
A plaintiff might also assert failure-to-warn claims against the 
chemical manufacturer or the tank manufacturer.
40
  Those claims 
might assert that the chemical manufacturer should have warned of 
the harm from the chemicals and the importance of securing them 
from unauthorized access and/or that the tank manufacturer should 
have warned that the tanks could be vulnerable to cyber attacks unless 
 
 34. See Port Authority, 189 F.3d at 313; see also Gaines-Tabb, 160 F.3d 613; Visser, 
supra note 22  (discussing case law). 
 35. See Port Authority, 189 F.3d at 310-11 (describing allegations that the manufacturers 
of chemicals used in the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center should have reformulated the 
chemicals to “decrease or eliminate their explosive properties”); see also Gaines-Tabb, 160 F.3d 
at 624-25 (rejecting similar allegations by plaintiffs injured in the 1995 Oklahoma City 
bombing). 
 36. See Gaines-Tabb, 160 F.3d at 624-25. 
 37. See Port Authority, 189 F.3d at 310-11. 
 38. Id. at 312 (“[U]nder New York law, theories of negligence and strict liability for 
design and warning defects are functionally equivalent.”). 
 39. See Aegis Ins. Services, Inc. v. 7 World Trade Co., 865 F. Supp. 2d 370, 384 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 40. See Port Authority, 189 F.3d at 310-11 (describing allegations that defendant 
manufacturers failed to advise their distributors and customers “to confirm that buyers in the 
general and unrestricted public market have legitimate and lawful purposes for use of 
Defendant’s products”). 
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additional protections were installed. 
In this scenario, however, the company storing the chemicals 
was aware of those particular risks.  A manufacturer’s failure to warn 
gives rise to liability only if “such a warning would have prevented 
the harm.”41  A court might be disinclined to find that the 
manufacturers were required to provide additional warnings about a 
potential attack.
42
  Companies are unlikely to have an obligation to 
“warn the suppliers of its product of possible criminal misuse.”43 
B. Scenario Two 
Assume for Scenario Two the same facts as Scenario One, 
except that the chemical company buys an industrial control system 
(ICS) without evaluating the security risks associated with it.  The 
company never inquires as to whether the ICS has been successfully 
subjected to a cyber attack before or whether the manufacturer has 
embedded any cyber security mechanisms in the ICS, and does not try 
to determine whether the ICS will integrate with existing cyber 
security systems or possible future purchases.
44
  Alternative ICS 
products exist, including ones built with “whitelisting” (meaning that 
they will only respond to specific commands, which is a cyber 
security measure that could have mitigated or defeated the cyber 
attack). 
1. Claims Against the Chemical Company 
As in Scenario One, whether the chemical company had a duty 
to the victims of the attackers and whether the company violated this 
duty is likely to be a question of fact.  An injured plaintiff might 
argue that, in light of the company’s knowledge of the risks, it was 
negligent for the company not to investigate the security of the ICS.  
As in Scenario One, whether that claim will succeed will depend on 
the foreseeability of the particular attack and other factors.
45
 
 
 41. Id. at 320. 
 42. Id. at 310-11. 
 43. Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613, 625 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(rejecting failure-to-warn claims against manufacturers of chemicals used in the Oklahoma City 
bombing). 
 44. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-82 
REVISION 1, GUIDE TO INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS (ICS) SECURITY (2013), available at 
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r1.pdf. 
 45. See, e.g., Doyle v. Exxon Corp., 592 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1979); see supra Part 
I.A.1.a. 
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2. Claims Against Other Entities 
Depending on the nature of the industrial control system used 
and the nature of the representations the seller made about the system, 
a plaintiff also might assert that the sellers failed to adequately 
disclose the limitations of the systems or that defects in the system 
caused the plaintiff’s losses.  The plaintiff would need to show that 
the ICS seller had a duty to the injured plaintiff and that it breached 
that duty.  It is not clear that such a duty would exist.
46
 
For the vendor to be liable for an injury, the harm must have 
been one that the security system was intended to prevent.
47
  The 
liability of the ICS seller may depend on the purpose of the product, 
and, in particular, whether it was intended to protect against 
operational problems or intentional attacks.
48
 
Whether the company storing the chemicals could assert claims 
for contribution, indemnity, or breach of contract against the ICS 
vendor might depend on the terms of the parties’ agreement.49  The 
company might also assert negligence or products-liability claims 
against the manufacturer of the control system.
50
 
C. Scenario Three 
Assume for Scenario Three the same facts as Scenario One, 
except in this case the cyber security vendor selling products and 
services to the chemical company makes specific representations 
regarding the capabilities of its products and services, including that it 
regularly updates its products and that it is one of the most 
comprehensive anti-virus products on the market.  The company does 
 
 46. See infra Part I.A; see also Port Authority, 189 F.3d at 320 (finding no New York law 
“which supports the existence of a duty to warn middlemen that consumers, after purchasing 
their product, may alter the products and harm third parties”). 
 47. See Lenox, Inc. v. Triangle Auto Alarm, 738 F. Supp. 262, 267 (N.D. Ill. 1990) 
(holding that an auto alarm company had a duty to “to install auto alarms in a manner that 
activates whatever deterrent capacity the alarm may have” but not to “to prevent the theft of 
plaintiff’s jewelry samples” since it was not foreseeable that a plaintiff would store over 
$100,000 worth of jewelry samples in his car); Collins & Sons Fine Jewelry, Inc. v. Carolina 
Safety Systems, Inc., 371 S.E.2d 539, 544-45 (S.C. 1988) (“[A] theft by burglary is a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of a malfunctioning alarm system.”). 
 48. See id. 
 49. See 2 RANDY V. SABETT, 2 INTERNET LAW AND PRACTICE § 27:19 (Westlaw 2013). 
 50. See supra Section I.A.2; infra Section I.C.2.  But see Rustad & Koenig, supra note 
15, at 1579 (“Although product liability concepts have been extended to durable goods that 
incorporate software, they have never been applied [to] defective software alone because such 
causes of action were initially conceived as remedies for personal injury, rather than for 
financial loss.”). 
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not note, however, that the product does not protect against 
specifically targeted attacks.  Instead, it only says “we regularly 
update our programs so that you will have best in class protections 
available.”  After the attack occurs an audit discovers that the cyber 
security program would never have stopped the kind of attack that 
happened.  On top of that it is discovered that the cyber security’s 
quality control process was imperfect, such that updates were not sent 
regularly or timely, and that there was a defect in the software that 
hackers with moderate to advanced skills could use to deactivate the 
protections in order to facilitate an attack. 
1. Claims Against the Chemical Company 
The company would be likely to argue in this scenario that its 
investigation of the cyber security product and its efforts to mitigate 
the risk of a cyber attack constituted reasonable care and that it 
therefore cannot be held liable for negligence.  Whether that argument 
would succeed could depend on the factual question of whether a 
reasonable entity in the company’s position would have undertaken 
further investigations. 
2. Claims Against the Cyber Security Vendor 
a. Claims by the Chemical Company 
Depending on the terms of the cyber security vendor’s 
agreement with the company, it might be liable to the company for 
damages arising from the vendor’s breach of its agreement.51  The 
company might assert contract claims based on the stated scope of 
services, standard of care, or any warranties or other representations 
about the product’s capabilities, and it might allege that any stated 
limitations on the vendor’s liability did not apply.52  Whether those 
claims would succeed would depend on the agreement’s language and 
the particular attack.  The vendor might also be liable to the company 
for negligence if the vendor breached its duty to the company and the 
parties’ agreement did not limit that liability.53 
 
 51. See Mary G. Leary, 72 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts - Liability for Security or Burglar 
Alarm System Failure § 5 (2013). 
 52. Cf. id. 
 53. See Abdallah v. Caribbean Sec. Agency, 557 F.2d 61, 63 (3rd Cir. 1977) (“In those 
cases dealing with the liability of a burglar alarm company whose system fails to function, it has 
been held that the company is not liable for the loss on the theory that the burglary was an 
unforeseeable intervening criminal act breaking the chain of causation. However, while an 
intervening criminal act usually breaks the chain of causation and thereby negates liability based 
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The vendor may also be liable to its customer for negligent or 
intentional misrepresentation, depending on the circumstances.
54
 
These claims will depend on the whether the inaccuracies in the 
vendor’s statements were “material” to the company’s decision to buy 
the product and the knowledge available to the vendor when it made 
its statements.
55
  In some circumstances, the vendor could be strictly 
liable for offering a defective product.
56
 
b. Claims by Other Parties 
As in Scenario Two, the vendor would probably not be liable to 
non-customers injured in the attack unless a court found that the 
vendor had a duty to those claimants and its breach of that duty 
proximately caused their injuries.
57
 
A court will probably be reluctant to find that a security system 
vendor has a duty to claimants other than their own customers, absent 
unusual circumstances.
58
  The seller of a security system is unlikely to 
 
on negligence, where an intervening act is foreseeable, the original actor’s negligence may be 
considered the proximate cause of the loss and he may be liable notwithstanding the intervening 
criminal act.”); 72 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts - Liability for Security or Burglar Alarm System 
Failure § 2 (2013) (“A finding that intervening criminal conduct was foreseeable as a result of 
the defendant’s negligence appears to be particularly likely, or at least may require the 
submission of the causation issue to the jury, where the original conduct involved was intended 
to prevent the very harm that occurred, such as where the negligent conduct involved the 
installation, servicing, or monitoring of a security or burglar alarm system, and a burglary occurs 
thereafter.”). 
 54. See 72 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts - Liability for Security or Burglar Alarm System 
Failure § 4 (2013) (citing case law). 
 55. See id. at §§ 4, 4.5. 
 56. See id. at § 6 (“[U]nder the appropriate circumstances, the negligent manufacturing of 
a burglar alarm system can be the proximate cause of damages where it is reasonably 
foreseeable that a defectively manufactured burglar alarm system would increase the likelihood 
of successful burglaries.”). 
 57. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 15, at 1603 (“If terrorists had exploited a security 
hole in software to conduct illicit communications channels to coordinate [the September 11 
attacks], the security hole theoretically could be deemed a cause-in-fact of the billions of dollars 
of damages that occurred . . . . A court would be unlikely to determine the insecure software a 
proximate cause of the thousands of deaths and destruction even if the security hole was a 
cause-in-fact of the attacks.”). 
 58. See Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm Services, 412 N.E.2d 472, 475 (Ill. 1980) (finding 
that a security service was not liable to a tenant who was injured in a crime); see also Gaston 
Furs Ltd. v. Comet Realty Corp., 640 N.Y.S.2d 485, 486 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (finding a 
security guard service was not liable for building tenant’s losses in a theft when the service’s 
“contract with the [building] owner limited its services to the lobby of the building” and “[t]here 
was no evidence that it assumed a special duty of care to [the tenant]”); New Focus Sportswear, 
Inc. v. P.J. Fabrico, Inc., 561 N.Y.S.2d 570, 571 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (finding that a sprinkler 
company hired by a building manager did not owe a duty to the customer of a building tenant); 
SHEPARD’S EDITORIAL STAFF, 6 CAUSES OF ACTION 659, §§ 6.5, 9 (1985) (citing cases). 
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have a duty to a non-customer when the seller did not accept that 
obligation and the non-customer did not take action in reliance on the 
system.
59
  In some cases, though, an injured party may be a 
foreseeable beneficiary of the security vendor’s agreement with its 
customer.
60
  If so, the vendor could be liable to injured third parties 
for breaches of its obligations under the contract.
61
 
A duty to third parties may arise if the parties specify that the 
third parties are intended to be beneficiaries of the agreement or if the 
vendor’s affirmative error “creates or increases an unreasonable risk 
of harm” or “renders the third-party beneficiary less safe on balance 
than if no action had been taken at all.”62  An injured party might 
argue that the defects in the security system created an “unreasonable 
risk of harm” by failing to protect the company’s systems adequately 
or by negligently misleading the company about the extent of its 
security protections.
63
 
A court might find that vendors of cyber security systems have a 
duty to at least some non-customers if the parties’ agreement 
specified that a purpose of the controls was to protect third parties or 
if the vendor’s failures unreasonably increased the harm to the non-
customers.  It is not clear whether that duty would extend to all 
 
 59. See Gerace v. Holmes Protection of Phila., 516 A.2d 354, 358 (Pa. 1986) (finding that 
the owner of a ring stolen in a burglary at a jewelry store could not state a claim against the 
store’s security vendor as a third-party beneficiary of the agreement between the store and the 
vendor), app. den. 527 A.2d 541 (Pa. 1987); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. 
HARM § 43 (2012); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965). 
 60. See Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 493 N.E.2d 1022, 1028 (Ill. 
1986) (a fire alarm company had a duty of care to tenants whose premises adjoined its 
customer’s space in a warehouse); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 
43 (2012); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965) (“One who undertakes . . . to 
render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third 
person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his 
failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise 
reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed 
by the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the 
third person upon the undertaking.”). 
 61. See Phoenix Ins. Co. v. APF Fire Protection, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7935, 2012 WL 
3834743, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2012) (finding that a tenant of a building may be 
considered a third-party beneficiary of a building owner’s agreement with a sprinkler 
maintenance company). 
 62. See id. 
 63. Cf. ADT Security Services, Inc. v. Swenson, 276 F.R.D. 278, 305 (D. Minn. 2011) 
(denying summary judgment to a security services company on negligence claims when the 
estate and children of a murdered customer offered evidence that the customer “was lured into a 
false sense of security by presuming that [the security company] had installed a security system 
that would provide audible notice when [the murderer] cut the telephone wires and broke into 
the home”). 
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potential plaintiffs injured by the cyber attack.
64
  Even if the cyber 
security vendor owes a duty of care to parties other than its 
customers, that duty may be circumscribed by the vendor’s agreement 
with its customers.
65
  As a practical matter, that means that third-party 
claimants may be bound by any contractual limits on negligence 
liability.
66
  Public policy may prevent the vendor from limiting its 
liability for gross negligence or intentional misconduct.
67
 
D. Scenario Four 
Company X operates a facility involved in the handling and 
disposal of extremely hazardous and dangerous materials, such as 
explosives or highly volatile chemicals.  The materials it stores must 
be kept in a precisely controlled environment, as a change in 
temperature, humidity, or excessive vibrations could result in 
catastrophic detonations.  Company X has recently automated such 
controls as a way to exclude the human error element.  A cyber 
security vendor sells Company X hardware and software to prevent 
the disruption or altering of the key storage controls.  Hackers, 
however, are able to defeat the cyber security controls, causing 
material changes in storage conditions that lead to explosions with 
resulting death, injuries, and business interruption for nearby 
commercial facilities due to the toxic releases and presence of 
 
 64. See SABETT, supra note 49 (“In order for an information security negligence action to 
prevail, there must initially be a duty between the organization whose system is breached and 
the third party with which the company has no preexisting contractual arrangement for the 
company to protect its computer network from threats to its own system . . . . Existing case law 
is not clear on whether there is such a duty . . . in the case of information security breaches.”).  
However, it may be difficult for third parties to establish the vendor’s duty to third parties.   
 65. See ADT Security Services, Inc., 276 F.R.D. at 303 (noting split between courts on the 
issue and holding that the children of a security system’s customer were bound by the 
limitations on liability in the customer’s agreement); John T. Coyne, Effect of Exculpatory 
Contractual Provisions on Tort Liability to Third Parties, 31 TORT & INS. L.J. 785, 785 (1996) 
(“Courts are divided over whether third-party tort claims are subject to exculpatory contractual 
provisions that limit the promisor’s liability to the promise.”); Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, 
Validity, Construction, and Application of Exculpatory and Limitation of Liability Clauses in 
Burglary, Fire, and Other Home and Business Monitoring Service Contracts, 36 A.L.R. 6th 
305, §§ 21-22 (2008) (citing cases deciding the issue both ways); but see Scott & Fetzer Co. v. 
Montgomery Ward & Co., 493 N.E.2d 1022, 1027-28 (Ill. 1986) (declining to apply contractual 
limits on liability to claims by third parties). 
 66. See ADT Security Services, Inc., 276 F.R.D. at 303; cf. Aphrodite Jewelry, Inc. v. 
D&W Central Station Alarm Co., Inc., 681 N.Y.S.2d 305, (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (enforcing 
exculpatory clauses of contract in a suit by the purchaser of a security system). 
 67. See ADT Security Services, Inc., 276 F.R.D. at 301 (D. Minn. 2011); Cirillo v. 
Slomin’s, Inc., 768 N.Y.S.2d 759, 769 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (declining to dismiss a 
consumer’s fraud claims against a security system vendor); Shields, supra note 65, §14. 
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unexploded but live material all around the facility. 
1. Claims Against the Chemical Company 
As discussed above, a company may have a heightened duty of 
care when it engages in abnormally dangerous activities.
68
  That duty 
may give rise to strict liability to third parties harmed by the 
activities.
69
 
2. Claims Against Other Entities 
The cyber security vendor may be considered to have breached a 
duty of care to purchasers of its product if a design defect in the 
control system permitted the cyber attack.
70
  Company X may be able 
to seek common-law indemnification from the cyber security vendor 
if the company was not itself negligent.
71
  Contractual indemnity may 
also be available, depending on the terms of the parties’ agreement. 
E. Scenario Five 
 Assume for Scenario Five the same facts as Scenario Four, 
except that the cyber security vendor markets its products and 
services specifically to the companies in the business of handling 
extremely dangerous materials, like Company X.  It markets its 
products as so robust and well-built that a business like Company X 
can rest easy knowing that it has bought cyber security products and 
services designed specifically to protect the incredibly precise 
requirements of Company X. 
1. Claims Against the Chemical Company 
In this scenario, the foreseeability of the particular harm that 
occurred may be greater than in the previous scenarios, since the 
 
 68. See supra Part I.A. 
 69. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 70. See supra Part I.A.2.  Compare 72 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts - Liability for Security 
or Burglar Alarm System Failure § 4 (2013) (“Liability under the strict liability doctrine may 
arise by virtue of a defect in the manufacture of, defect in the design of, or a failure to warn with 
respect to the use of a security or burglar alarm system.”), with Aegis Ins. Services, Inc. v. 7 
World Trade Co., 865 F. Supp. 2d 370, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that plaintiff failed to 
show that a building’s alleged design defect caused its damages in a terrorist attack). 
 71. See ERIC C. SURETTE, 41 AM. JUR. Indemnity § 21 (2d ed. 2014) (“The exceptions to 
the rule that indemnity will not be allowed among joint wrongdoers are that a joint wrongdoer 
may claim indemnity where he or she has not been guilty of any fault, except technically or 
constructively, or where both parties are at fault, but the fault of the party from whom indemnity 
is claimed was the efficient cause of the injury.”). 
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company was aware of a specific type of threat.
72
  However, as a 
factual matter, the company may be more likely to have acted 
reasonably, since it sought to purchase controls to address that 
specific threat.  As in the previous scenarios, the scope of the 
company’s duties and the reasonableness of its precautions are likely 
to be issues of fact. 
2. Claims Against Other Entities 
The cyber security vendor may be liable to the company for 
negligence or even strict product liability in this scenario.  A finder of 
fact is more likely to find that a product was defective when the injury 
to the plaintiff was the one that the plaintiff sought to guard against 
when it installed the product.
73
  The cyber security vendor may also 
be liable to Company X for breach of contract or breach of warranty 
if the vulnerability of the security controls to hackers breached the 
parties’ agreement.  Contractual clauses requiring Company X to 
indemnify or pay contribution to the cyber security vendor for the 
vendor’s liability probably would be enforceable in that situation, 
although there might be public policy limitations on the scope of that 
indemnification.
74
 
II. APPLICATION OF THE SAFETY ACT TO LIABILITY RESULTING 
FROM A TERRORIST ATTACK 
Given the above scenarios that could result in third party liability 
claims, the question is what risk-mitigation tools exist that could 
provide a statutory limit to or eliminate such claims?  Based on a 
review of existing statutes, regulations, and alternative options such 
as insurance coverage, the best opportunity for limiting liability is the 
SAFETY Act.  “Sellers” of cyber security products or services (a term 
that also includes companies that develop their own cyber security 
plans and procedures and then uses them only for internal purposes) 
are eligible to receive liability protections under the SAFETY Act.  
Additionally, entities that purchase or deploy SAFETY Act approved 
cyber security products and/or services will also have the benefit of 
 
 72. See District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d 30, 33 (D.C. 1987); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM §34 (2012) (“When . . . an independent act is also a 
factual cause of harm, an actor’s liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks that 
made the actor’s conduct tortious.”). 
 73. See supra Part I.B. 
 74. See SURETTE, supra note 71, at § 11 (“Agreements that purport to indemnify another 
for the other’s intentional negligence may be void as a matter of public policy.”). 
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immediate dismissal of third party liability claims arising out of, 
related to, or resulting from a declared act of terrorism (which 
encompasses cyber attacks, regardless of whether there is any motive 
or intent that could be deemed “political” in nature).  The basis for 
this conclusion, as well as the scope of the immediate dismissal 
offered to customers through the purchase of SAFETY Act approved 
products or services, is discussed below. 
Note that since no litigation specifically involving the SAFETY 
Act has occurred yet, there is no established legal precedent 
interpreting the statute itself.  However, the fundamental principles of 
the SAFETY Act are based on the existing common law “government 
contractor defense,” a well-established affirmative defense to third-
party litigation.  Accordingly, this article is based on interpretations of 
the SAFETY Act, the Final Rule implementing the SAFETY Act, and 
the underlying theory of the government contractor defense. 
A. Background of the SAFETY Act 
The SAFETY Act
75
 provides extensive liability protections to 
entities that are awarded either a “Designation” or a “Certification” as 
a Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology (“QATT”).76  Under a 
“Designation” award, successful SAFETY Act applications are 
entitled to a variety of liability protections, including: 
All terrorism-related liability claims must be litigated in federal 
court; 
Punitive damages and pre-judgment interest awards are barred; 
Compensatory damages are capped at an amount agreed to by both 
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the applicant.  
That damage cap will be equal to a set amount of insurance the 
applicant must carry, and once that insurance cap is reached no 
further damages may be awarded in a given year; 
A bar on joint and several liability; and 
Damages awarded to plaintiffs will be offset by any collateral 
recoveries they receive (e.g., victims compensation funds, life 
insurance, etc.)
77
 
Should the applicant be awarded a “Certification” under the 
SAFETY Act for their QATT, all of the liability protections awarded 
 
 75. 6 U.S.C. § 441-44 (2013). 
 76. 6 U.S.C. § 442(a) (2002); 6 C.F.R. § 25.7 (2006). 
 77. 6 U.S.C. § 442(a); 6 C.F.R. § 25.7. 
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under a “Designation” are available.78  In addition, the Seller of a 
QATT will be entitled to an immediate presumption of dismissal of 
all third-party liability claims arising out of, or related to, the act of 
terrorism.
79
  The only way this presumption of immunity can be 
overcome is to demonstrate that the application contained information 
that was submitted through fraud or willful misconduct.
80
  Absent 
such a showing, the cyber attack-related claims against the defendant 
will be immediately dismissed. 
In order for the SAFETY Act protections to be triggered, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security must declare that an “act of 
terrorism” has occurred.81  The definition of an “act of terrorism” is 
extremely broad, and includes any act that: 
(i) is unlawful; 
(ii) causes harm to a person, property, or entity, in the United 
States, or in the case of a domestic United States air carrier or a 
United States-flag vessel (or a vessel based principally in the 
United States on which United States income tax is paid and whose 
insurance coverage is subject to regulation in the United States), in 
or outside the United States; and 
(iii) uses or attempts to use instrumentalities, weapons or other 
methods designed or intended to cause mass destruction, injury or 
other loss to citizens or institutions of the United States.
82
 
The Secretary has broad discretion to declare that an event is an 
“act of terrorism,”83 and once that has been declared, the SAFETY 
Act statutory protections will be available to the Seller of the QATT 
and others.  A cursory review of this definition reveals that there is no 
need to divine a motivation for the attack, and that the language used 
can (and is) interpreted to include cyber attacks.  The only “intent” 
that must be demonstrated is the intent to cause destruction, injury, or 
other loss.
84
  Accordingly, cyber attacks trigger the protections of the 
SAFETY Act for cyber security products and tools as well.  
Moreover, cyber attacks conducted by any entity can be declared an 
“act of terrorism” under the SAFETY Act regardless of the 
 
 78. 6 C.F.R. § 25.8. 
 79. Regulations Implementing the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective 
Technologies (SAFETY) Act of 2002, 71 Fed. Reg. 33,147, 33,150 (June 8, 2006). 
 80. Id. at 33,153-54. 
 81. 6 U.S.C. § 444(1)-(2) (2013). 
 82. 6 U.S.C. § 444(2)(b) (2002). 
 83. Id. § 444(2). 
 84. Id. § 444(2)(b)(iii). 
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motivation or purpose of the group.  With that background, we can 
now explore the protections of the SAFETY Act as extended to 
purchasers of QATTs. 
B. SAFETY Act Protections Available to Customers and Other 
Entities 
One of the most significant additional benefits of the SAFETY 
Act is that the liability protections awarded to the Seller of the QATT 
flow down to customers, suppliers, subcontractors, vendors, and 
others who were involved in the development or deployment of the 
QATT.
85
  In other words, when a company buys or otherwise uses a 
QATT that has been either SAFETY Act “Designated” or “Certified,” 
that customer is entitled to immediate dismissal of claims associated 
with the use of the approved technology or service and arising out of, 
related to, or resulting from a declared act of terrorism. 
The bases for these expanded protections are clearly set forth 
both in the SAFETY Act statute and in the Final Rule implementing 
the SAFETY Act.  Both are detailed below. 
With respect to the protections offered to entities other than the 
Seller of the QATT, the SAFETY Act statute states as follows: 
IN GENERAL.—There shall exist a Federal cause of action for 
claims arising out of, relating to, or resulting from an act of 
terrorism when qualified anti-terrorism technologies have been 
deployed in defense against or response or recovery from such act 
and such claims result or may result in loss to the Seller.  The 
substantive law for decision in any such action shall be derived 
from the law, including choice of law principles, of the State in 
which such acts of terrorism occurred, unless such law is 
inconsistent with or preempted by Federal law.
  
Such Federal 
cause of action shall be brought only for claims for injuries that 
are proximately caused by sellers that provide qualified anti-
terrorism technology to Federal and non-Federal government 
customers.
86
 
The SAFETY Act statute also reads: 
JURISDICTION.—Such appropriate district court of the United 
States shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all actions 
for any claim for loss of property, personal injury, or death arising 
 
 85. Regulations Implementing the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective 
Technologies (SAFETY) Act of 2002, 71 Fed. Reg. at 33,150 (“Further, it is clear that the Seller 
is the only appropriate defendant in this exclusive Federal cause of action.”). 
 86. See 6 U.S.C. § 442(a)(1) (2002) (emphasis added). 
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out of, relating to, or resulting from an act of terrorism when 
qualified anti-terrorism technologies have been deployed in 
defense against or response or recovery from such act and such 
claims result or may result in loss to the Seller.
87
 
The key language in 6 USC Section 442(a)(1) is that the claims 
arising out of, relating to, or resulting from an act of terrorism “shall 
be brought only for claims for injuries that are proximately caused by 
sellers that provide qualified anti-terrorism technology to Federal and 
non-Federal government customers.”88  Further, in Section 442(a)(2), 
the SAFETY Act states that U.S. district courts shall have original 
and exclusive jurisdiction for claims that “result or may result in loss 
to the seller.”89 
The language in 6 U.S.C. Section 442(a)(1) and (a)(2) reads such 
that terrorism-related claims that have or could have resulted in a loss 
to the Seller may only be brought in U.S. district courts against the 
Seller.
90
  Nothing in the statute would give rise to claims against other 
parties who use or otherwise participate in the delivery and use of the 
QATT. 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agrees with this 
interpretation, and went to great lengths to elaborate upon this point in 
the preamble to the Final Rule implementing the SAFETY Act 
statute: 
Further, it is clear that the Seller is the only appropriate defendant 
in this exclusive Federal cause of action.  First and foremost, the 
Act unequivocally states that a “cause of action shall be brought 
only for claims for injuries that are proximately caused by sellers 
that provide qualified anti-terrorism technology.”  Second, if the 
Seller of the Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology at issue were 
not the only defendant, would-be plaintiffs could, in an effort to 
circumvent the statute, bring claims (arising out of or relating to 
the performance or non-performance of the Seller’s Qualified Anti-
Terrorism Technology) against arguably less culpable persons or 
entities, including but not limited to contractors, subcontractors, 
suppliers, vendors, and customers of the Seller of the technology.
  
Because the claims in the cause of action would be predicated on 
the performance or non-performance of the Seller’s Qualified Anti-
Terrorism Technology, those persons or entities, in turn, would file 
 
 87. See 6 U.S.C. § 442(a)(2) (2002). 
 88. Please note that “non-Federal government customers” refers to commercial entities. 
 89. 6 U.S.C. § 442(a)(2). 
 90. See also Regulations Implementing the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective 
Technologies (SAFETY) Act of 2002, 71 Fed. Reg. at 33,150. 
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a third-party action against the Seller.  In such situations, the 
claims against non-Sellers thus ‘‘may result in loss to the Seller’’ 
under 863(a)(2).
  
The Department believes Congress did not intend 
through the Act to increase rather than decrease the amount of 
litigation arising out of or related to the deployment of Qualified 
Anti-Terrorism Technology.  Rather, Congress balanced the need 
to provide recovery to plaintiffs against the need to ensure 
adequate deployment of anti- terrorism technologies by creating a 
cause of action that provides a certain level of recovery against 
Sellers, while at the same time protecting others in the supply 
chain.
91
 
Within the Final Rule itself, the Department also stated: 
There shall exist only one cause of action for loss of property, 
personal injury, or death for performance or non- performance of 
the Seller’s Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology in relation to an 
Act of Terrorism.  Such cause of action may be brought only 
against the Seller of the Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology and 
may not be brought against the buyers, the buyers’ contractors, or 
downstream users of the Technology, the Seller’s suppliers or 
contractors, or any other person or entity.
92
 
Thus, both the SAFETY Act statute and the Final Rule 
implementing the law make it clear that when there is litigation 
involving a SAFETY Act QATT (whether Designated or Certified) 
alleging that the QATT was the cause, directly or indirectly, of any 
alleged losses, the only proper defendant in such litigation is the 
Seller of the QATT.  Customers and others are not proper defendants 
and are entitled to immediate dismissal, because allowing litigation to 
proceed against customers would be contrary to both the SAFETY 
Act statute and Congressional intent. 
C. Application of SAFETY Act Protections to Cyber Security 
Vendors and Their Customers 
Considering the above, companies that sell or deploy cyber 
security QATTs, as well as their customers, are entitled to extensive 
benefits.  Sellers of cyber security QATTs are entitled to the broad 
protections offered under both a “Designation” and a “Certification.”  
Additionally, as discussed in greater detail below, companies that 
purchase cyber security QATTs are entitled to unmatched liability 
protections. 
 
 91. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 92. 6 C.F.R. § 25.7 (2006) (emphasis added). 
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As explicitly set forth in the SAFETY Act statute and the 
SAFETY Act Final Rule, the only proper defendant in litigation 
following an act of terrorism allegedly involving a SAFETY Act 
Designated and/or Certified QATT is the Seller itself.
93
  In this case, 
the “Seller” would be the cyber security vendor or company that 
deploys its own internally developed cyber security policies, 
procedures, or technologies with the QATT being said Certified or 
Designated cyber security policies, procedures, or even technologies. 
The basis for this analysis rests upon the fact that sellers of cyber 
security QATTs will have received the QATT Designation or 
Certification, thus conferring upon them specific statutory liability 
protections.  Further, based on the extensive analysis conducted above 
regarding the applicability of the SAFETY Act statute and Final Rule, 
buyers of cyber security QATTs will be considered “customers” for 
SAFETY Act purposes, and therefore entitled to immediate dismissal 
of claims related to approved cyber security technology or service.  
Thus, for any of the previously discussed scenarios where liability to 
third parties could occur, the SAFETY Act can serve as an excellent 
tool to mitigate or eliminate said liability. 
This interpretation is based upon the SAFETY Act statute and 
Final Rule, both of which make it clear that the purpose of the 
SAFETY Act is to dramatically limit litigation following a terrorist or 
cyber attack and narrow the universe of possible defendants as much 
as possible.
94
  In the case of cyber security QATTs, allowing litigation 
to proceed against customers of those QATTs would be in violation 
of the plain language of the SAFETY Act.  Therefore, claims against 
the cyber security QATT customers would be an attempt to 
circumvent litigation against the Seller of the technology, and should 
not be allowed under the SAFETY Act statute. 
Accordingly, customers of cyber security QATTs are entitled to 
receive significant liability protections as a result of a SAFETY Act 
Designation and/or Certification to the Seller, and such protections 
will dramatically limit customers’ exposure to potential litigation 
following a cyber attack.  Additionally, the Seller of the cyber 
security QATT would be entitled to all appropriate protections 
offered by the SAFETY Act, whether those offered by Designation or 
the presumption of dismissal offered by Certification.  It is important 
to note that cyber security QATT customers and Sellers could still 
 
 93. See supra Part II.B. 
 94. See supra Parts II.A-B. 
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face cyber security related litigation should the Homeland Security 
Secretary not declare the cyber attack to be an “act of terrorism” or if 
the claims do not relate to the QATT as defined by the Department of 
Homeland Security.
95
 
CONCLUSION 
Entities that are potentially at risk for third-party liability claims 
following a cyber attack can be materially protected through the 
SAFETY Act.  Users of SAFETY Act-approved cyber security 
products or services will also receive direct and tangible benefits.  
The SAFETY Act provides strong liability protections that will flow 
down to such customers per the language of the SAFETY Act statute 
and Final Rule.  Cyber attacks and cyber security products and 
services are covered by the language of the SAFETY Act, and thus, 
such products and services are also eligible to provide dramatically 
limited litigation and for such litigation to be limited to “Sellers,” not 
“customers.” 
Certainly not every cyber attack will result in liability for cyber 
security vendors or their customers, particularly with respect to third 
party liability.  Should such liability occur, however, it can be 
mitigated or eliminated using the SAFETY Act. 
 
 
 95. With the definition of “act of terrorism” set forth under the SAFETY Act, 
functionally any unlawful attack intended to cause harm to the U.S., its populace, or its 
economic interests could be considered a “terrorist” attack.  The Secretary has extraordinarily 
broad discretion with respect to declaring an event an “act of terrorism”, and so that should be 
considered the appropriate boundaries for purposes of the SAFETY Act.  No events have been 
declared acts of terrorism yet, so we still operate in the realm of the hypothetical.  It will depend 
on what party is in office—odds are a Republican administration will consider a broader range 
of events as “acts of terrorism”, and the opposite will hold true for a Democratic administration.  
However, that is a guess given the absence of any actual declarations by the Secretary of 
Homeland Security. 
